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Abstract Why should all human beings have certain rights simply by virtue of being
human? One justification is an appeal to religious authority. However, in increasingly
secular societies this approach has its limits. An alternative answer is that human rights
are justified through human dignity. This paper argues that human rights and human dignity
are better separated for three reasons. First, the justification paradox: the concept of human
dignity does not solve the justification problem for human rights but rather aggravates it in
secular societies. Second, the Kantian cul-de-sac: if human rights were based on Kant’s
concept of dignity rather than theist grounds, such rights would lose their universal validity.
Third, hazard by association: human dignity is nowadays more controversial than the
concept of human rights, especially given unresolved tensions between aspirational dignity
and inviolable dignity. In conclusion, proponents of universal human rights will fare better
with alternative frameworks to justify human rights rather than relying on the concept of
dignity.
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1 Introduction
Human rights are not uncontroversial. Why should all human beings have certain rights
simply by virtue of being human? One possible justification for such universal rights is an
appeal to religious authority: human beings have universal rights because of the word of
God. However, in increasingly secular societies this justification can be meaningless to
many.
An alternative answer is that human rights are justified through human dignity. “Human
dignity is the rock on which the superstructure of human rights is built” (Beyleveld and
Brownsword 2001: 13), it is “the ground of rights” (Waldron 2009:2, my emphasis), it is
“the basis on which one can claim rights from others” (Sensen 2011: 73).
In this article, I shall argue that human rights1 and human dignity are uncomfortable
bedfellows for three reasons. First, the justification paradox: the concept of human dignity
does not solve the justification problem for human rights but rather aggravates it in secular
societies. Second, the Kantian cul-de-sac: if human rights were based on Kant’s concept of
dignity rather than theist grounds, such rights would lose their universal validity. Third,
hazard by association: human dignity is nowadays more controversial than the concept of
human rights, especially given unresolved tensions between aspirational dignity and invio-
lable dignity.
Much of my argument rests on the meanings I give to “human being” and “rights holder”.
Hence, this needs clarification, which I shall provide in a separate box (Box 1). Based on
these definitions and given the above three points, I will show that human rights are better
separated from a dignity foundation. Before I proceed, a short introduction to dignity’s
standing in legal documents is required.
2 Dignity, Axioms and Incompletely Theorized Agreements
Surprisingly, the term dignity was not part of the language of law or jurisprudence
before the 20th century. It was first mentioned in the Constitution of the Weimar Republic in
1919, followed by the Portuguese Constitution in 1933 and the Irish Constitution in 1937
(Tiedemann 2006: 13). However, it was only the concept’s inclusion in international legal
documents which marked its ascendancy. Table 1 lists the main legal instruments which
make prominent reference to dignity, starting with the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights in 1948.
Looking at human dignity as used in the above human rights instruments, one might
argue that human dignity and human rights have equal standing. Only one of the cited
instruments (the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966) says
explicitly that human rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person. The
others seem to make no distinction between the two. The “inherent dignity” of human beings
and their “inalienable rights” (United Nations 1948) seem to be axioms; self-evident
truths, which require no further justification (Groeschner 2005: 19). Hence, they are cited in
1 When I refer to human rights, I mean as laid down in the legal instruments listed in Table 1.
D. Schroeder
Author's personal copy
the Preamble or earlier articles of these instruments without further details or explan-
ations. They stand side by side, uninterpreted, as assertions that all parties agreed
upon.
This interpretation of the equal standing of human rights and human dignity is possible.
However, many senior human rights scholars seem to take a different view. “If human
dignity … is not one of the fundamental values … of the theory [of human rights] it is likely
to disappear, never to be seen again” (Nickel 2007: 53, my emphasis). It seems rather that the
concept of dignity precedes and justifies human rights (Griffin 2008: 31, Tugendhat 1993:
358; Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001: 13, 21, Waldron 2009: 2). In the following, I shall
proceed from the assumption that dignity serves as the foundation for human rights in at
least some of the above legal instruments.
One may then reasonably ask why a concept, which has been described as useless
(Macklin 2003), arbitrary (van Steendam et al. 2006: 788), elusive (Ullrich 2003: 17),
groundless (Rachels 1990: 171), a fog-inducing drug (Wetz 2004: 227—my translation)
Table 1 Dignity in legal instruments and guidelines
Origin Quote
UN Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. 1948. Preamble.
The recognition of the inherent dignity and of the
equal and inalienable rights of all members of the
human family is the foundation of freedom, justice
and peace in the world.
German constitution. 1949. Article 1. Human dignity is inviolable.
The Constitution of India. 26th
November, 1949. Preamble.
We, the people of India, having solemnly resolved to constitute
India into a Sovereign Socialist Secular Democratic Republic and
to secure to all its citizens: justice … liberty…
equality … to promote among them all fraternity assuring the
dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity
of the Nation.
International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 1966
Recognizing that these rights derive from the inherent
dignity of the human person.
Constitution of the Russian Federation.
1993. Article 7.
The Russian federation shall be a social state,
whose policies shall be aimed at creating conditions,
which ensure a dignified life and free development of man.
South African Constitution, 1996.
Founding Provisions, Chapter 1.
The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state
founded on the following values:
a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the
advancement of human rights and freedoms.
Switzerland Constitution, 1999,
Chapter 1, Article 7.
Human dignity is to be respected and protected.
European Constitution, Article I-2 and
Article II-61.
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity,
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for
human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to
minorities.
Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected.
Human Rights and Human Dignity
Author's personal copy
and without reference point (Statman 2000: 536) can be given such extraordinary
significance? In fact, the Canadian Supreme Court decided in 2008 that dignity was
not to be used in anti-discrimination cases any longer as it was “confusing and
difficult to apply”.2
Of course, not all commentators have such a disapproving view of the concept.
Others believe that it is extremely powerful (Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001: 62),
revolutionary (Wood 2007) and represents the human ability to choose good over evil
(Spaemann 1987: 304).
Pessimistically speaking, one might argue that the power of the concept lies in its
vagueness. From the early days of drafting human rights instruments, dignity seemed to
be the concept that succeeded in achieving consensus between very diverse negotiators.
When the South African President, Jan Christiaan Smuts (1870–1950), suggested the
opening lines for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1945, he made reference
to “fundamental human rights” and “the sanctity and ultimate value of human personality”
(Tiedemann 2006: 13f). Yet, the drafters changed sanctity to dignity to achieve the broad
consensus required (ibid.).
Axioms such as dignity are not ideologically fixed in their meaning, thereby
allowing a basic consensus between different world views. One person may interpret
dignity from a religious perspective, another from a philosophical perspective and
yet another from a pragmatic perspective3 (ibid.). Former German President Theodor
Heuss referred in this context to the “non-interpreted thesis” (ibid.), an axiom that is not
fixed in its meaning and can therefore marry otherwise opposing views. Legal commentator
Cass Sunstein (1995) speaks of “incompletely theorized agreements”. One may for exam-
ple be able to achieve consensus on constitutional rights (e.g. the prohibition on torture) but
not on constitutional theories or constitutional values, unless these are highly abstract
and no particular meaning has to be agreed. This is arguably the case with the
concept of dignity.
In this article, however, I do not want to criticise the concept’s vagueness any
further. This has been done often (Birnbacher 2004; Macklin 2003). Besides, the concept
can be clarified significantly, if it is accepted that it has diverse meanings (Beyleveld
and Brownsword 2001; Schroeder 2008, 2010). Once clarified, individual concepts of
dignity can be meaningfully employed (Schroeder 2006, 2011). What I would like to argue
instead is that proponents of universal human rights are better off looking for
alternative frameworks to justify human rights rather than relying on the concept of dignity.
Attempts at clarifying the concept of dignity will not turn out in their favour. Or to
put it more strongly, when asked: “why should all human beings have certain rights
simply by virtue of being human?” the answer “because of human dignity” will be
2 R. v Kapp 2008 Supreme Court Canada 41 at § 22: “… human dignity is an abstract and subjective notion
that, even with the guidance of the four contextual factors, cannot only become confusing and difficult to
apply; it has also proven to be an additional burden on equality claimants, rather than the philosophical
enhancement it was intended to be.”
3 For instance one could maintain: “Since Catholics generally believe in God-given human dignity, and may
therefore accept human rights indirectly, I shall accept the term’s use in this legal instrument, even though I am
only interested in human rights.”
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counter-productive. The substantiation of this claim will take up the remainder of this
article.
Box 1: Clarification of Concepts 
Human Beings:  
The bioethics literature often differentiates human beings from persons (Walters, 1997; 
Meilaender, 1995). Human beings are a biological species; homo sapiens. Persons are
defined as those members of the species that display certain cognitive abilities and self-
consciousness, or at least the capacity for both. Hence, on this view, any reader of this 
article would be considered a person whilst patients in an irreversible permanent vegetative 
state would not. Persons are usually ascribed the capacity of reason and autonomous 
decision-making power, whilst non-persons have neither. Human rights instruments are 
sometimes optimistic, sometimes unclear in their ascriptions. For instance, the Preamble of 
the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (Ninth International Conference of 
American States, 1948, my emphasis) optimistically states that "All men are … endowed by 
nature with reason and conscience". However, not all homo sapiens (men or women) are  
endowed with reason.
The European Convention has been criticized as it allegedly "confuses human rights in the 
sense of respecting persons’ autonomy with human rights in the sense of granting human 
beings desirables and protecting them from undesirables" (Delkeskamp-Hayes, 2000: 165). 
For the purpose of this article, I mean all human beings, biologically speaking, when I refer to  
humans; I do not restrict discussions to (bioethical) persons.  
Rights Holders and Duty Bearers: 
The relationship between rights and duties is a widely discussed topic amongst philosophers. 
For instance, Onora O'Neill (1996: 131) rejects the existence of welfare rights or positive 
rights, such as the human right to shelter, because it is not "claimable"; there is nobody on 
whom one can place a claim for shelter (excluding special responsibilities of, say, parents). 
For O'Neill, as for many Kantians (Sensen, 2011: 84), duties are prior to rights and only 
provide the possibility for the existence of rights (Tugendhat, 1993: 336-363). For those who 
derive rights through duties, it could be maintained that one cannot be a right holder unless 
one is able to discharge duties. Of course, only persons are able to discharge duties; for 
instance, people in a permanent vegetative state cannot.  
Hugo Bedau (1982) outlines three types of societies in "International Human Rights". In 
society one, all interaction is based on duty. In society two, legal rights are granted bound to 
specific characteristics and roles of citizens. In society three, all humans have rights 
independent of special characteristics or roles. Those who believe that only duty bearers 
have rights fit best to society two. In this paper, I assume that the legal instruments in Table 
1 envisage society three, as do I.  
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3 The Justification Paradox
The concept of dignity is deeply imbued with religious significance. According to the Koran
(1946 translation: Chapter al-Isra, verse 70; Shura, verse 7; Luqman, verse 10), everything
created is noble and has dignity.4 According to a Buddhist commentator, “the source of
human dignity in Buddhism lies … in the … infinite capacity of human nature for
participation in goodness” (Keown 2000: 70f). According to the late Pope John Paul II
(1995):
Man, living man, is the glory of God (Gloria Dei vivens homo)… Man has been given
a sublime dignity, based on the intimate bond which unites him to his Creator: in man
there shines forth a reflection of God himself.
When the drafters of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights referred to human
dignity in the late 1940s, they could reliably count on support from a vast number of
religious believers. Since then the number of believers has declined rapidly, especially in
the West. British sociologist of religion Steve Bruce (2002) mirrored Nietzsche in his claim
that “God is Dead” when writing about secularization in the West. In Britain today, “non-
believers outnumber believers … by almost two to one”. 63% of those questioned in a 2006
ICM/Guardian poll said they were non-religious, as opposed to 33% who would describe
themselves as religious (Glover and Topping 2006).
As a result of secularisation, the self-evidence of the dignity axiom has declined markedly
since the middle of the last century, as the religious reference is simply no longer available to
many. If asked, “why should all human beings have certain rights simply by virtue of being
human?” the answer, “because God has imbued human beings with dignity”, may no longer
satisfy the majority. This moves the justification requirement from human rights to human
dignity. Reference to the words of God will not close the justification circle. Dignity is no
longer an axiom that does not require justification itself.
As a result, the concept of human dignity does not solve the justification problem for
human rights but rather makes it worse in contemporary secular societies. Without reference
to religious authority, it is much more difficult to justify that all human beings have inherent
dignity than to justify that all human beings have human rights.
Whilst Richard Rorty (1993) is likely to throw out the baby (human rights) with the
bathwater (dignity), his views are also incisive. He claims that “on the pragmatist view … it
is a question of efficiency, of how best to grab hold of history—how best to bring about the
utopia sketched by the Enlightenment.” To him, it “is not clear why ‘respect for human
dignity’ … must presuppose the existence of any such attribute.” He believes that all
foundationalist5 attempts at justifying human rights are doomed to fail. For him, “the
question whether human beings really have the rights enumerated in the Helsinki Declara-
tion6 is not [even] worth raising” (ibid). States have already accepted that human beings
have universal human rights by signing the legal instruments cited in Table 1, so why talk
about foundational issues? That is a fair point, from a pragmatic perspective, but it hits
4 Thanks to AH Banisadr for this information.
5 Foundationalism is the attempt to stop infinite justification regress by agreeing on basic beliefs that are self-
evident. A foundationalist will therefore argue that one value or concept or belief, e.g. human dignity, can
provide a justification for others, which are not self-evident.
6 Rorty is writing about the right to access to health care. Hence, his reference to the World Medical
Association’s Declaration of Helsinki rather than any of the human rights instruments from my Table 1.
However, his general argument applies to both.
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foundationalist debates about dignity much harder than foundationalist debates about human
rights. Besides, many philosophers find the pragmatist approach unsatisfactory.
For human rights, one could resort to contractual theory as the foundation. The justifi-
cation for human rights would then come from the decision of legitimate representatives of
the peoples who have agreed a human rights charter. Rights would then be granted to the
people by their legislature, and protected and fulfilled by their executive. Accepting both as
though a contract had been signed would impose on citizens the duty to see fellow citizens as
rights holders (Tugendhat 1993: 346). It is much more obvious that negotiators could have
agreed that human beings have human rights, which they listed in detail in various decla-
rations, than that they agreed that human beings are bearers of a more metaphysical property
such as dignity. The concept of dignity was predominately justified by religious connota-
tions in the past, it was assumed to be self-evident. To attribute dignity through agreements
based on international legal negotiations or acts of parliament seems to miss the point. It was
exactly the almost mystical powers with which the concept was imbued, which gave it such
foundationalist standing. Also, why add yet another dimension to the justification debates?
Proclaim dignity by mutual agreement of legislators in order to justify humans rights
indirectly? It makes much more sense to proclaim human rights by legislator agreement,
full stop, without the detour via dignity.
There is, however, one possibility for the foundationalist, namely an attempt to
provide a secular foundation for dignity, upon which human rights can rest. If this
were successful, we would have a foundation for dignity, which in turn provided a
foundation for human rights. The most promising candidate for a secular foundation
for dignity goes back to Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). Perhaps one can find, at least,
what Jeremy Waldron (2009: 10) counts as “foundation-ish”, when explicating Kant’s view
on dignity.
4 The Kantian cul-de-sac
Kant’s most famous reference to dignity can be found in the Metaphysics of Morals (Kant:
1797, 1990: 434f).
… a human being regarded as a person, that is, as the subject of a morally practical
reason, is exalted above any price; for as a person… he is not to be valued merely as a
means to the ends of others or even to his own ends, but as an end in himself, that is,
he possesses a dignity (an absolute inner worth) by which he exacts respect for himself
from all other beings in the world. He can measure himself with every other being of
this kind and value himself on a footing equal to them. . . . Humanity in his person is
the object of the respect which he can demand from every other human being.
Why do human beings have absolute inner worth or in other words, dignity? Because of
their reasoning faculties, which give them the freedom and ability to distinguish moral from
immoral actions. Or as Kant scholars often put it, because of humanity’s “rational nature in
its capacity to be morally self-legislative” (Wood 1999: 115). Due to reason, human beings
can establish and justify their own moral laws. They can go beyond following rules given
externally through authorities, including religious authorities. They can ponder whether it is
morally right to make a lying promise they will not be able to keep, and they can come to the
conclusion that it is not (Kant 1785, 1998: 4:402f). This conclusion is open to all rational
humans; humans can think and give themselves moral commandments. They are autono-
mous and, according to Kant (ibid: 4:436), “autonomy is … the ground of the dignity of
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human nature and of every rational nature”. Allen Wood (2007: 10) paraphrases this idea of
Kant’s:
We could sum up the qualities Kant thinks make for dignity if we said that dignity
belongs to the capacity to think for oneself and direct one’s own life with responsi-
bility both for one’s own well-being and for the way one’s actions affect the rights and
welfare of others.
If one wanted to coin a term for the type of dignity, which Kant describes, one could talk
about Mitgiftwürde (gift or dowry dignity) (Höffe 2002: 67), dignity one has intrinsically,
without being able to give it up. In this regard, Nelson Mandela or Aung San Suu Kyi have
no more dignity than mass murderers, torturers, rapists or paedophiles. They all have dignity
as members of the human species. Such dignity does not have to be earned (Hill 1997). Kant
(1797, 1990: 463, my translation) alludes to this point, when he says “I cannot deny all
respect even to a vicious man”.
This respect, the respect one cannot deny even to a vicious man, is the foundation for human
rights. It builds the bridge between dignity, apparent in those with the capacity to be morally
self-legislative, and the rights they have. Kant captured this in the Formula of Humanity,
Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in
the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an
end (Kant 1785 1998: 4:429).
Could Kant’s understanding of dignity in connection with the Formula of Humanity give
us a secular foundation for human rights? Yes and no. Yes, if we are willing to exclude some
human beings from the realm of human rights.7 No, if we are looking for an answer to the
question posed at the outset: why should all human beings have certain rights simply by
virtue of being human? In the remainder of this section, I shall assume that we want human
rights to apply to all human beings.
Why could Kant’s concept of dignity not lead to human rights for all? The strict answer
would be because only those human beings who are morally self-legislative, who can
distinguish what is morally right from what is morally wrong, have dignity, and therefore
indirectly human rights. This reasoning would exclude huge numbers of human beings from
the relevant realm, small children to begin with, but at an extreme, everybody who is asleep.
However, one could respond with John Locke (1690 2002: §55—my emphasis), who made
a similar point on the equality of human beings. He said: “Children, I confess, are not born in
this full state of equality, though they are born to it.” Hence, children are not born in the state
of rational self-legislation, but are born to it. Children will grow up, sleepers will wake up
and then join or re-join Kant’s kingdom of ends, “a systematic union of various rational
beings” (Kant 1785 1998: 4:433). However, a very small number of human beings will never
be able to join or re-join the kingdom of ends and these are the beings who would, by
implication, be excluded from human rights.
For instance, patients in an irreversible, i.e. permanent vegetative state will never regain
the capacity for moral self-legislation that is the foundation for dignity. When Ron Bontekoe
(2008: 6) comments on Kant’s understanding of dignity, he writes:
The difference between being fully human and being merely a human animal—and
thus the difference between possessing and lacking the dignity attendant upon one’s
7 This might have been Kant’s most likely position. According to Oliver Sensen (2009: 104), “Kant does not
seem to give an argument that all human beings have an absolute worth”.
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humanity is a matter of one’s possessing autonomy, a matter of being a free initiator of
events rather than a mere conduit for impulses provided one by nature.
Martha Nussbaum (2000: 73) puts this even more strongly and argues that the one who is
not able to shape her own life as a dignified free being and for whom
the absence of capability for a central function is… acute … is not really a human
being at all, or any longer—as in the case of certain very severe forms of mental
disability, or senile dementia.
This leads us into the Kantian cul-de-sac. On the one hand, those beings who are the
subjects of a morally practical reason are exalted above any price and possess an absolute
inner worth, i.e. dignity. As a result, they have rights. Whilst one can thus justify human
rights through Kantian secular dignity, one loses the attribution of dignity to all human
beings. Simply stating that Kant’s concept of dignity is a suitable foundation for human
rights and ignoring this attribution problem would be to stick one’s head in the sand. Or as
Paul Tiedemann (2006: 111f—my translation) puts it; the unwanted exclusion of some
human beings from the dignity realm
is no valid objection. The foundation of a concept cannot be dependent on wished-for
results. Otherwise one does not provide a foundation, but instead utters more or less
concrete … intuitions, whose justification remains open.
Any attempt to use Kantian dignity to claim human rights for all therefore fails.
5 Hazard by Association and Returning to the Start
In recent years, the concept of dignity has come under strong, others might call it vicious,
attack, as already noted above. Harvard Professor of Psychology Steven Pinker (2008) goes
one step further in “The Stupidity of Dignity”. He calls it a “squishy, subjective notion,
hardly up to the heavyweight moral demands assigned to it” and concludes that “the concept
of dignity remains a mess”.
His article is well-suited to explain the main mess the concept finds itself in. It is a mess
not so much about squishyness or vagueness as about the lack of adequate words to capture
distinct meanings. The concept has at least five distinct meanings defined in Table 2
(Schroeder 2010).
The specific labels I have chosen for the above meanings of dignity are less important
than the fact that distinct and contradictory meanings of dignity can be outlined. Especially
the distinction between aspirational dignity, that requires effort, and inviolable or inherent
dignity, which does not, is problematic. Steven Pinker (2008), used here as an example,
seems to equate dignity with comportment dignity. He writes;
Exactly what aspects of dignity should we respect? For one thing, people generally
want to be seen as dignified. Dignity is thus one of the interests of a person, alongside
bodily integrity and personal property, that other people are obligated to respect. We
don’t want anyone to stomp on our toes; we don’t want anyone to steal our hubcaps;
and we don’t want anyone to open the bathroom door when we’re sitting on the john.
Pinker uses his understanding of dignity in a piece attacking the US President’s Council
on Bioethics 555-page report, entitled Human Dignity and Bioethics (2008). He complains
that “three-quarters of the invited contributors … [have] religious entanglements” and asks
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why “ethical challenges of twenty-first-century biomedicine [are addressed] using Bible
stories, Catholic doctrine, and woolly rabbinical allegory?” (Pinker 2008). Comparing
apples and oranges does not even come close to describing this mismatch between what
Pinker sees as dignity and what most of the authors of the US report understand by it; at least
they are both fruit. Traditional Catholic dignity and Comportment dignity are entirely
different beasts. One is about the sanctity of life, the other about “sitting on the john”
(amongst other things).
It should be clear from the above what the problems for human rights proponents
are when using the concept of dignity as a foundation for human rights. These are
problems of attribution. Understood as aspirational dignity, not all human beings
would have dignity and therefore not all human beings would be owed human rights.
In fact, linking dignity to virtue and merit, like Goethe does (A wreath is much easier
bound, than a dignified head for it found8), would exclude a large number of humans from
the realm of human rights; many more than Kant. More controversial still are assignments of
dignity according to comportment abilities, what Pinker (2008) lists as “cleanliness… and
control of the body“. Clearly these have no place in discussions about human rights,
otherwise any profoundly physically disabled person would have to be excluded from
human rights.
Looking at the above dignity definitions in Table 2 an even deeper problem becomes
apparent. If we want to use dignity as the foundation for human rights and accord all
human beings human rights, then only the Traditional Catholic understanding of dignity is
appropriate.9 The other understandings exclude at least small groups from the realm of dignity
(e.g. patients in a permanent vegetative state are excluded on the Kantian account).
This brings us back to the beginning, of trying to find a secular understanding of
dignity to ground human rights, when the only suitable candidate we are left with is a religious
view.
Table 2 Distinct meanings of dignity
Inviolable
dignity
Traditionala
Catholic dignity
Dignity is an inviolable property invested by God in all human beings,
which makes each life sacred.
Kantian dignity Dignity is an inviolable property invested in all rational beings due to
their capacity for moral self-legislation. As dignity holders, rational
beings have the right to exact always respect for their sense of purpose
and self-worth.
Aspirational
dignity
Aristocratic
dignity
Dignity is the quality of a human being who has been invested with
superior rank and position and acts accordingly.
Comportment
dignity
Dignity is the outwardly displayed quality of a human being who acts in
accordance with society’s expectations of well-mannered demeanour
and bearing.
Meritorious
dignity
Dignity is a virtue, which subsumes the four cardinal virtues and one’s
sense of self-worth.
a I have added the term “traditional” to “Catholic Dignity” here to distinguish Papal pronouncements such as
John Paul II’s (1995) from more liberal Catholic thinkers such as the dissident Catholic theologian Hans
Kueng
8 Ein Kranz ist gar viel leichter binden, als ihm ein würdig Haupt zu finden. My translation.
9 I take the Traditional Catholic understanding of dignity to be an example of religious understandings. Hence,
my claim is not that only Traditional Catholics can justify human rights through human dignity. Other
religions are likely to have equally tenable justifications at their disposal, as long as the justification is used
only amongst believers.
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6 Conclusion
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and many academic and legal
commentators see dignity as the grounds for universal human rights. I have raised three
objections to this. First, in times of increasing secularisation, human dignity is no longer an
axiom, a self-evident belief. Instead the concept opens the door to infinite regress by
requiring its own justification. Why should all human beings have dignity? Human rights
can be justified, for instance, through contractarian theory and agreement by legitimate
representatives of the people. This possibility would seem counter-intuitive when applied to
dignity as it would require decisions to be made on an arguably metaphysical property by
voting. It would also add an unnecessary layer of complexity when such voting could simply
agree directly upon human rights.
Second, the main secular alternative to God-given dignity has been provided by Imman-
uel Kant, who argued that human dignity derives from the human capacity for moral self-
legislation. However, universal human rights cannot be bestowed through Kantian dignity,
which must exclude those who will never (re)gain rational faculties, or else fail as a
Fig. 1 The role of dignity for
human rights
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foundationalist position. The capacity for moral self-legislation cannot be the grounds for
human dignity if an ad-hoc addition is required so that dignity also applies to those to whom
the criterion itself will never apply. This move would invalidate the justification effort.
Third, and pragmatically speaking, the attacks on dignity in moral and legal discourse
seem much more sustained and vicious than attacks on human rights. Hence, the question
poses itself: why risk one’s efforts by association?
In conclusion, proponents of universal human rights are better off looking for alternative
frameworks to justify human rights rather than relying on the concept of dignity. However,
there is one proviso.
There is one important role that dignity can play within human rights debates. For this to
be possible, the relationship between human rights and dignity has to be reversed. Dignity is
then no longer the foundation for human rights, but rather informs the content of human
rights. Those who formulate, pronounce on and try to protect human rights would use
empirical instances of dehumanization as experienced in, for example, Nazi Germany,
during the Cultural Revolution, or in Abu Ghraib, to refine their efforts (Fig. 1).
Even Steven Pinker (2008) accords “dignity a measure of cautious respect” in this regard.
“When … dissidents in the Cultural Revolution … [are] forced to wear grotesque haircuts
and costumes, onlookers will find it easier to despise them“. Instances of humiliation and
degradation are difficult to capture with a list of human rights, because they are context-
dependent. Wearing a yellow star could be a fashion fad or something much more sinister
and dehumanizing, as in the case of Nazi Germany. It is here that the main benefit for human
rights proponents lies when evoking the concept of dignity. Describing attempts at degra-
dation and humiliation, which are often referred to as affronts to dignity or instances of
forced indignity, could help in specifying individual human rights and developing measures
to protect them.
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